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ABSTRACT: A model of interaction between hardware vendors, Intel and AMD, and developers of 
Windows and Linux operating systems is suggested. Intel and AMD both maximize profits forming a 
traditional  oligopoly,  while  Microsoft  and  the  community  of  Linux  developers  form  a  mixed 
duopoly, in which only the first party maximizes its profit. We consider a Cournot situation, when 
each of the profit maximizing suppliers sets the price based on available market information on 
other  players’  products  prices  in  the  previous  time  moment,  and  assuming  the  cross price 
elasticities to zero. At the Cournot equilibrium, an Intel based PC running Windows is 5 times more 
expensive  than  AMD based  PC  running  Linux;  an  Intel  CPU  costs  2  times  more  than  AMD 
processor; Windows license is 1,5 times more expensive than Intel processor; and the profit of Intel 
is 4 times greater than the profit of AMD, while Microsoft has just 12,5% greater profit than Intel. 
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Over the recent years, an increasing large number of industries have evolved from vertical to 
horizontal integration, where some firms design and manufacture components which are assembled 
by other firms for the final customers. In these horizontal industries, firms are ‘complementors’ 
rather  than  customers,  suppliers,  or  competitors.  IT  industry  demonstrates  the  most  striking 
examples  of  such  an  organization.  There  are  suppliers  of  hardware  components  (processors, 
memory  modules,  motherboards,  video  cards,  monitors,  drives,  etc.),  suppliers  of  software 
(operating systems, office suites, etc.), and assemblers of computers providing the market with 
servers and workstations (usually with preinstalled software). 
CPUs could be made by Intel or AMD, PCs could be assembled by ASUS, Dell, Hewlett 
Packard, IBM and others, on the same computer one of the two operating systems can be installed 
(Microsoft Windows or Linux), and various applications can work under different operating systems 
(e. g., Microsoft Office and OpenOffice). 
The horizontal integration of IT industry is linked to setting up an open standard for IBM PC 
in 1980. As a result, there was a deep specialization of component manufacturers, assemblers, and 
software  developers.  In  particular,  the  IBM’s  decision  of  choosing  Intel  and  Microsoft  as 
manufacturers of CPUs and operating systems as  the  key PC components  has led  to Intel and 
Microsoft domination at the PC market for almost 30 years (in contrast to IBM, which has lost its 
strategic positions in this market).  
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According to Casadesus Masanell, Nalebuff and Yoffie (2007a), in 2007 more than 80% of 
the PCs worldwide were shipped with an Intel CPU running Microsoft Windows operating system 
while there are a lot of producers of other PC components (motherboards, memory modules, drives, 
monitors, etc.) in this market. 
As it was demonstrated by Yoffie,  Casadesus Masanell and Mattu (2004),  the combined 
profit of Intel and Microsoft during most years in the 1990s exceeded the total profit of the entire 
world PC industry. 
In 2004, for example, Intel and Microsoft earned over $15B in net profits while the three 
largest assemblers (Dell, HP and IBM) made roughly just $2.5B in profits from their PC operations. 
IBM alone lost over $1B in PCs in 1998, and another $1B between 2001 and 2004. Only Dell made 
material profits in the PC industry at that time. For more detailed information on market dynamics 
see Yoffie, Casadesus Masanell and Mattu (2004). 
This gives  us  the  reason to assume Microsoft and Intel the key strategic players in  the 
market of PCs that have a direct impact on the final product price (unlike the manufacturers of the 
other components). 
Unlike the microprocessor market, where the main player (Intel), and its closest competitor 
(AMD), and other manufacturers seek to maximize their profits, the modern software market is 
characterized  by  the  asymmetry  of  suppliers’  interests,  some  of  the  software  suppliers  are 
maximizing their profits from the sale of licenses for their products (like Microsoft), while other 
software developers are distributing their products for free, often even with open source code. 
For  example,  for profit  manufacturers  had  a  monopoly  in  the  server  operating  systems 
market 15 years ago, because the users did not trust non commercial software that did not guarantee 
quality, reliability and security; now the commercial software product Microsoft Windows and its 
non commercial competitor Linux each have approximately 40% of the server operating systems 
market. In contrast to Microsoft, the Linux developers community distributes this operating system 
for free and with open source code under GNU GPL license) 
The  competition  in  the  software  market  essentially  differs  from  a  competition  in  the 
markets of traditional material goods (including CPUs) due to the special features of software as a 
good, first of all, due to the absence of rarity. 
At the moment all the software users are choosing between the three options: 
•  to buy licenses and use the commercial proprietary software (e. g. Microsoft Windows as 
an operating system, Microsoft Office as an office suite, Microsoft SQL Server as a database server, 
Microsoft Internet Information Server as a web server, etc.); 
•  to use free or open source software (e. g. Linux as an operating system, OpenOffice as an 
office suite, MySQL as a database server, Apache as a web server, etc.); 
•  to pirate (i. e. to use proprietary software without buying licenses). 
These three options correspond to the following three types of software market players: 
profit maximizers (for example, Microsoft); 
•  non for profit players (for example, Linux team); 
•  pirates. 
Correspondingly,  the  software  developers  try  to  determine  the  optimal  way  of  income 
collecting: 
•  to sell the licenses for the use of their products; 
•  or  to distribute the products for  free  and to collect incomes from sales of additional 
services. 
As the real market shows, there is no unambiguous answer for the formulated questions. 
There are whole countries, using illegal copies of the proprietary software almost at 100%.  
The  number  of  non commercial  software  users  grows,  and  software  developers  that 
distribute their products with open source code receive stable incomes. 




receive a steady income from the sales of licenses. 
Such a market structure requires new approaches to research methodology as well as to 
business development methodology. 
 
Literature review  
A.Cournot  in  the  seminal  book  (1838)  has  considered  the  first  model  in  mathematical 
economy for interactions between monopolists producing complementary products  (manufacturers 
of copper and zinc that are combined to make a brass as a composite product). 
The  main  result  developed  by  Cournot  using  this  model  of  complementary  products 
suppliers’ interaction is that suppliers will divide the profits equally non depending on the relation 
of the components prices! 
However, in the real IT market there is a competition both between hardware manufacturers 
(there are Intel based and AMD based servers and workstations in the market), and between of 
operating systems suppliers (Microsoft Windows and Linux). 
While price competition between vertically differentiated goods as well price competition 
between complementors are each well understood in mathematical economics, but the combined 
case  of  competition  between  competing  complements  is  investigated  insufficiently  and  needs 
additional research. 
McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989) studied game theory model of packaging products 
into  a  bundle  and  obtained  conditions  when  bundling  is  an  optimal  strategy  for  the  suppliers. 
Developing this research Choi and Stefanadis (2001), and Nalebuff (2004) investigated a question 
on expediency of entering into the market with a composite product. 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) have considered Intel and Microsoft as an example of 
players  who co operate and  compete  simultaneously, they even  have  introduced  the  term  «Co 
Opetition» for a designation of interaction of players of this kind. 
Casadesus Masanell and Yoffie (2006) suggested the game model for the situation of co 
operation and competition of Intel and Microsoft, and as a result of research it has appeared that 
unlike  Cournot  model  where  both  manufacturers  divide  the  profits  fifty fifty,  in  this  case  the 
optimal strategy of Microsoft is to underprice in order to increase the client base, but Intel in reply 
to it should simply overprice and get the additional profit because an operating system is not on sale 
separately from a PC (see also the case study by Joffe, Kasadesus Masanell and Mattu (2004). 
Farrell and Katz (2000) have considered a situation, when the exclusive manufacturer of one 
component enters into the competitive market of the second component in order to reduce its price, 
and as a consequence, the price of a composite product. This model can be applied to Intel activities 
on motherboards manufacturing in addition to CPUs, but not to interaction of manufacturers of 
software and hardware. 
Cheng and Nahm (2007) have considered Stakelberg's strategy in a situation of cooperation 
and competition of exclusive manufacturers of two components, each of which can be used as a part 
of a composite product, and separately. In the IT market using of one component (hardware or 
software)  without  another  is  impossible,  and  in  addition  there  is  a  competition  between 
manufacturers of components.  
Chen, Nalebuff and Nalebuff (2006) have investigated competitive interactions in markets 
with one way essential complements (first product is essential to the use of the second product, but 
can be used without the second product). Chen, Nalebuff and Nalebuff have applied this model to 
study the market of operating systems and applied software. They have shown that it is favourable 
to operating systems developer to enter into the competitive market of applied software with a 
competing version of application and to sell it at zero price. As a result, the existing competitors in 
the applied software market will be compelled to join the monopoly. 
One of the recent steps in the duopoly theory was to combine the classic market duopoly 




objectives of players are mixed rather than symmetric. This step was done by Cassadesus Masanell 
and Ghemawat (2006) who have proposed a dynamic mixed duopoly model and applied this model 
to Windows/Linux competition dynamics. 
Using  the  optimal  control  theory  Casadesus Masanell  and  Ghemawat  (2006),  and  (with 
some extensions) Soloviev (2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a) have obtained the conditions when Linux 
and Windows coexist in the market, and when one of the products is pushed out by another. The 
special focus in these models was given to a piracy of Windows and strategic contributions to Linux 
issues. 
Among  other  works  on  IT  economics  we  will  note  works  of  Katz  and  Shapiro  (1985), 
Economides (1996), Yu (1998), Gawer and Cusumano (2002), and Soloviev (2009a), devoted to 
investigation of various network effects in the IT market. 
It is necessary to mention the deep survey of the current state of the network economics 
applications to the IT market, with particular attention to such network effects, as scale effect, price 
discrimination, competition for a monopoly position and standards wars, in book by Varian, Farrell 
and Shapiro (2004). 
Casadesus Masanell, Nalebuff and Yoffie (2008) have presented a model of interaction of 
two  competing  hardware  suppliers  (Intel  and  AMD)  with  the  exclusive  operating  systems 
manufacturer (Microsoft). This work represents, as a matter of fact, the first research of a competing 
complements. This paper considers competition between suppliers of complementing components  
(Intel and Microsoft), and between competing suppliers of similar components (Intel and AMD). 
Soloviev (2009a, 2009b, 2009c) has extended the Casadesus Masanell, Nalebuff and Yoffie 
(2008)  model  to  interaction  of  two  competing  hardware  suppliers  (Intel  and  AMD)  with  two 
competing operational systems manufacturers, Microsoft corporation (the developer of proprietary 
Windows operating system), and non commercial Linux operating system developers community. 
Here  we  continue  to  study  the  problem  of  profit  distribution  among  the  suppliers  of 
components in the IT market, started by Kasadesus Masanell, Nejlbuff, Yoffie (2008) and Soloviev 
(2009a, 2009b, 2009c). 
 
Assumptions 
Let's discuss the basic assumptions of hardware and software suppliers’ interaction model. 
1º.  The  bundle  of  hardware  (a  PC)  with  preinstalled  operating  system  is  selling  in  the 
market. 
There are Intel based and AMD based PCs in the market, each of which can be selling with 
one of two operating systems preinstalled (Windows or Linux). 
Windows operating system is distributing by Microsoft corporation on a commercial basis 
by selling licenses, while Linux operating system is distributing by Linux developers community 
freely and free of charge. 
The operating system is preinstalled on each PC before it enters the market, therefore we do 
not consider the possibility of a proprietary operating system illegal copies use. 
Thus, the user selects one of four products:  
•  Intel based PC running Windows;  
•  Intel based PC running Linux;  
•  AMD based PC running Windows;  
•  AMD based PC running Linux. 
2º.   Nowadays,  the  Windows/Linux  competition,  especially  in  the  netbooks  segment,  is 
growing because the Windows license costs more than 10% of the final product price for many 
models.  
Although  the  Windows  license  price  is  positive,  and  Linux  is  distributed  freely,  both 
products co exist on the market. It means that a consumer values Windows greater than Linux.  




greater than AMD based PC. 
Thus, it is assumed that with other things being equal the consumer prefers an Intel based 
PC to an AMD based PC, and a PC running Windows to a PC running Linux.  
It is supposed also that the difference in consumer value of different hardware is less, than a 
difference in consumer value of identical hardware with different operating systems. 
3º.  The demand functions for the combined products are linear. 
4º.  The user will buy the bundled product (a PC with an operating system) if and only if the 
consumer value of this product for this user exceeds its price.  
Thus from two products, both valued by the consumer greater than their prices, the user will 
choose the product with the least price, and from two products, for which the user is ready to pay 
the same price, he will choose (if possible) the product with the greatest consumer value. 
5º.  The hardware and software prices are made up of fixed costs, manufacturer's profit, 
variable costs and technical support costs. 
Fixed costs and technical support costs for the software developers are insignificant enough, 
and variable costs are close to zero at all (it does not cost too much to burn a CD with a copy of 
software product, and it costs almost nothing to release the product in the Internet). 
Technical support costs for  hardware and software manufacturers are approximately  the 
same. 
Fixed costs are essentially greater for hardware manufacturers than for software developers, 
but variable costs (as well as for software suppliers) are close to zero (because the manufacturer 
needs to build a hi tech plant which costs several billion dollars in order to produce CPUs, but then 
the production of a CPU costs less than 1 dollar). 
Products are offered in the market during quite a long time without essential changes of 
functionality. In other words, manufacturers incur fixed costs just once, then collect them back by 
manufacturing and selling products, then start to receive net profits.  
Therefore  it  is  possible  to  assume  that  Intel,  AMD  and  Microsoft  make  their  pricing 
decisions based on the aim of maximization of instant profits, i.e. profits calculated taking into 
account variable costs, but not fixed costs. 
6º.  Hardware and software manufacturers do not conspire and do not co operate in other 
ways. Each manufacturer makes the pricing decisions based on available market information on the 
prices of other players' products (i. e., so called Cournot situation is considered).  
7º.  When making pricing decisions each manufacturer considers that other players do not 
react on the change of the price by this manufacturer, i.e. cross price elasticities are equal to zero. 
8º.  The  prices  of  all  the  products  essentially  exceed  variable  costs  for  these  products 
manufacturing. 
9º.  PC assemblers form the market of a perfect competition, and could not affect the price 
of the bundled product (a PC with an operating system), unlike manufacturers of CPUs and the 
proprietary  operating system. 
It is assumed that the bundled product price is the sum of the CPU price and the operating 
system price. 
Let's use the following designations: qmax — PC market capacity; CI and CA — the maximal 
possible prices for Intel based PC and for AMD based PC, correspondingly; CI + W and CA + W — 
maximal  possible  price  for  Intel based  PC  running  Windows  and  for  AMD based  PC  running 
Windows; cI and cA — prices for Intel and AMD CPUs set by manufacturers; cW — Windows license 
price set by Microsoft; qI + W and qI + L — demand Intel based PC running Windows and Linux; qA + W 
and qA + L — demand AMD based PC running Windows and Linux; qI and qA — demand on Intel and 
AMD CPUs; qW and qL — demand on Windows and Linux; fI, fA and fW — fixed costs of Intel, AMD 
and Microsoft; vI, vA and vW — variable costs of Intel, AMD and Microsoft;  , I A π π  and  W π  — 
profitы of Intel, AMD and Microsoft. 





In  the  formulated  assumptions  the  model  of  hardware  and  software  manufacturers’ 
interaction looks as follows. 
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There are two possible cases of the order of bundled products prices, not contradicting the 
formulated assumptions. AMD based PC running Windows can appear more expensive, than Intel 
based PC running Linux: 
  , + > + > > I W A W I A c c c c c c   (1) 




  . + > > + > I W I A W A c c c c c c   (2) 
Let's calculate the basic characteristics of the model for each of these cases. 
In the case (1) the demand for Intel based PCs running Windows and Linux will be equal to 
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the demand for AMD based PCs running Windows and Linux will be  
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respectively. 
The demand for CPUs will be  
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and the demand for operating systems will be 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Further  calculations  are  given  in  table  no.  1.  The  Cournot  strategy  for  each  market 
participant is defined as such a price of the product, which leads to the maximum profit on the 
assumption that the other players will not change their prices. 
 
Table no. 1 
Basic characteristics of the model 
Supplier  Demand  Profit  Cournot price strategy 
Case (1) 
Intel  ( ) max 2 = − + I A I A A q q C c c C   ( )
( )( ) max 2
= − − =
= − + − −
I I I I I
A I A I I A I
q c v f
q C c c c v C f
π
  ( ) 2 4 = + + I A I A c C v c  
AMD  ( ) max 2 = − A I A A q q c c C   ( )
( )( ) max 2
= − − =
= − − −
A A A A A
I A A A A A
q c v f
q c c c v C f
π
  ( ) 2 = + A I A c c v  
Microsoft  ( ) max = − − W A A W A q q C c c C   ( )
( )( ) max
= − − =
= − − − −
W W W W W
A A W W W A W
q c v f
q C c c c v C f
π
  ( ) 2 = + − W A W A c C v c  
Case (2) 
Intel  ( ) max = − − I A I W A q q C c c C   ( )
( )( ) max
= − − =
= − − − −
I I I I I
A I W I I A I
q c v f
q C c c c v C f
π
  ( ) 2 = + − I A I W c C v c  
AMD  ( ) max 2 = + − A I W A A q q c c c C   ( )
( )( ) max 2
= − − =
= + − − −
A A A A A
I W A A A A A
q c v f
q c c c c v C f
π
  ( ) 2 = + + A I W A c c c v  
Microsoft  ( ) max = − − W A A W A q q C c c C   ( )
( )( ) max
= − − =
= − − − −
W W W W W
A A W W W A W
q c v f
q C c c c v C f
π
  ( ) 2 = + − W A W A c C v c  
 
Obviously,  
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For the case (1) these conditions are equivalent to the following ones: 
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Results 
Let's assume that manufacturers change their prices in discrete time moments, and these 
moments coincide for all the market participants. Let 
( ) t
I c  and 
( ) t
A c  be the prices of Intel and AMD 
CPUs, and 
( ) t
W c  be Windows license prices at the time  0,1, = K t  
Let the prices 
(0) (0) , I A c c  and 
(0)
W c  at the initial moment satisfy the conditions (3) and (4) for 
situations (1) and (2) respectively. 
It's assumed that in each moment t the manufacturer makes the pricing decision based on the 
known information on the prices of  other products in the previous moment  1 − t . 
The following assertions are fair. 
Assertion 1 on the instability of the case (2). If at the initial time  0 = t  the order of the 
prices corresponds to the case (1) then the order of the prices will change to the case (2) at the next 
moment  1 t =  and then will not change any more. 
Proof. If at the initial moment there was a situation (2): 
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then according to table no. 1 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
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Comparing 
(1) (1) + A W c c  and 
(1)
I c , we obtain that 
  ( )
(1) (1) (1) (0) (0) (0) 2 3 2 2 2 4 0, + − = + − + + + − > A W I I W A A A W I c c c c c c C v v v  
because 
(0) (0), > I A c c  and all the variable costs are negligible in comparison to the prices. 
Thus, 
(1) (1) (1) + > A W I c c c , i. e. at the moment  1 t =  we observe the case (1). 
If at some time  1 − t  there is a situation (1): 
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t t t t t t
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Comparing 
(1) (1) + A W c c  and 
(1)
I c , we have the following: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
(1) (1) (1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) 2 2 4 0,
− − − + − = − + − + + − >
t t t
A W I I A A A A W I c c c c c C c v v v  
because 
( 1) ( 1) ( 1) , ,
− − − > <
t t t
I A A A c c c C   and  all  the  variable  costs  are  negligible  in  comparison  to  the 
prices. 
The assertion is proved. 
Assertion 2 on the Cournot equilibrium prices. 
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QED. 
If we assume that instant profit is the difference between gain and variable costs, then the 
following assertion is fair. 
Assertion 3 on equilibrium instant profit of market players. 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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max max
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max max
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
max max
lim lim 2 2 2 3 7 ;
lim lim 2 2 2 3 7 ;
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q C c c c v C q C v v C
q c c c v C q C v v C
q C c c c v C q C v v
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π
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If we ignore variable costs, then 
  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
max max max
lim 2 7; lim 7; lim 3 7;
lim 5 7; lim 4 7;





+ ≈ + ≈
π ≈ π ≈ π ≈ % % %
t t t
I A A A W A t t t
t t t t
I W A A W A t t
t t t
I A A A W A t t t
c C c C c C
c c C c c C
q C q C q C




We can see that the most expensive bundle product (an Intel based PC running Windows) in the 
Cournot equilibrium is approximately 5 times more expensive than the cheapest product (AMD based PC 
running Linux); an Intel CPU costs approximately 2 times more than AMD processor; Windows license is 
approximately 1,5 times more expensive than Intel processor, and approximately 3 times more expensive 
than AMD processor. 
The instant profit of Intel is 4 times greater than the instant profit of AMD, while the instant profit of 
Microsoft is just 12,5% greater than the instant profit of Intel. 
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